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Capital Formation Alternatives: An Overview 
Stephen J. Friedman * 
FRIEDMAN: I thought it would be interesting to discuss some of 
the major trends in financing in the American financial markets be- 
cause they are a very good index of the direction in which financing 
is headed and of what practitioners can expect to be doing over the 
next five or ten years. I would like to talk about five principal cur- 
rents in the financial market. 
The first development, and by far the most important, is the vol- 
atility of interest rates. The second is the "dealerization" of the pub- 
lic securities markets, both for debt and equity. The third is the 
increasing internationalization of the capital market. A fourth trend 
is the significant growth and profusion of a very interesting develop- 
ment called "synthetic securities." The fifth trend is in the area of 
venture capital. 
I will start with the volatility of interest rates. In this environ- 
ment it is hard to imagine that for more than a quarter of a century 
after the bank crash of 1929 and the remedial legislation of the 1930s 
there was extraordinary stability of interest rates. Regulation Q1 is 
the system of regulation that authorized the Federal Reserve Board 
and other regulators to impose ceilings on deposit interest rates. 
Regulation Qauthority commenced in 1933, and until 1957, deposit 
interest rate ceilings were raised only once. The United States ex- 
perienced a period of extraordinary stability during which a very ef- 
fective financing device developed called the long-term bond market 
which was virtually unknown in other parts of the world at that time. 
Beginning in 1966 and continuing through the Carter Adminis- 
tration, the United States began to experience a series of sharp inter- 
est rate increases, which had a devastating effect on the long-term 
bond markets. Investors began to shorten their time horizons and 
even insurance companies, which historically made loans of twenty 
and twenty-five years duration, began to shorten their maturities to 
fifteen, ten, and seven years. It became very difficult to finance in- 
* Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, New York; former Commissioner, Se- 
curities and Exchange Commission. A.B. 1959, Princeton University; J.D. 1962, Harvard 
University. 
12 C.F.R. $ 217 (1984). 
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dustrial plants on that basis. Of course. the most immediate and dra- 
matic effect was on the mortgage market. 
I remember when I was at the Treasury Department in 1978 re- 
viewing the terms of the first variable rate mortgage, which was a 
device that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board approved to deal 
with the problem of interest rate volatility and to help thrift institu- 
tions withdraw from the uneconomic business of making long-term, 
fixed rate mortgages. The initial version of the variable rate mort- 
gage was not an attractive instrument and was not used very widely. 
That little trickle now has become a river with an incredible Dro- 
fusion of similar instruments. If you have tried recently to finance a 
house you know that it is almostimpossible to comprehend the full 
range of alternatives. That same profusion of new instruments has 
developed in the public debt markets. Innovative investment bankers 
have created an e ~ e r - ~ r o w i n ~  "kitbag" of securities designed to do 
two things. First, the securities give the issuer the protection of 
long-term maturities by enabling him to keep the money for a sub- 
stantial period of time. Second, they give the investor protection 
against erosion of principal due to interest rate movements. 
The following excerpt from Corporate Financing Week2 cap- 
tures the flavor of what is happening in this market: 
Citicorp Person-to-Person came to market last Tuesday with a $250 mil- 
lion floating rate note issue, a "substantial portion" of which was 
sitting with sole manager First Boston by Friday morning, according 
to Curt Welling, V.P. The frns float % of a point over the Fed CD 
composite, a market that was in turmoil last week with rumors and 
concerns about banks that are part of the run, and Welling said that 
First Boston had "pulled back from the market" in offering the notes 
and will "sit until a semblance of sanity comes back." Meanwhile, he 
said the firm was comfortable holding this paper in inventory, while 
declining to specify the amount unsold. 
Although the source of the trouble was the CD base, Welling 
said that First Boston had made the bid to Citicorp to do the deal 
because the widening spread between the CD rate and Treasury bills 
would offer investors better principle protection than bill-based 
floaters. The floaters have a weekly yield reset, a feature well-suited 
to a highly volatile market, Welling noted.3 
Although this involved a Citicorp financing, it is relevant for 
those of us who do financing work for-medium and small sized com- 
panies. All of these financing techniques trickle down, and what 
seems to be at the cutting edge of the market one year becomes a 
conventional financing technique five years later. 
- 
There is a range of attempts to cope with the effect of volatile 
interest rates. An interesting development in the public finance mar- 
Banking Turmoil Slows CD-Baed Citicorp Deal, Corporate Financing Week, vol. X, no. 
2 1 (May 28, 1984). 
Corporate Financing Week at 2. Citicorp Person-to-Person is a subsidiary bank 
holding company that does financing throughout the country for Citibank. 
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ket is the so-called "put-bond," which has been used widely in con- 
nection with housing bonds. The housing bond is a long-term 
revenue bond that is supported by a flow of payments from home 
mortgages. The revenue bond investor is given the option of "put- 
ting" the bond back to the issuer after a period of time or when cer- 
tain interest rate parameters have been exceeded. From the 
investor's point of view it is not necessarily a long-term investment, 
but rather a shorter-term investment which, of course, affects the 
return. 
Typically a bank issues a letter of credit that backs up the is- 
suer's obligation to purchase the bond and effectively promises the 
issuer and the market the availability of financing to make the 
purchase. The effect again is to convert the original long-term issue 
into a shorter-term floating rate if the letter of credit is taken down. 
An interesting sideline is that the importance of bank credit facilities 
has given banks larger roles as underwriters of revenue bonds. 
Housing revenue bonds are bank eligible, and because the letter of 
credit is such an essential element of financing, banks have been in- 
creasingly co-managing underwriters in many of these deals. 
There are two other interesting consequences of the develop- 
ment of volatile interest rates that often are not identified with that 
trend because they are not instruments that are, strictly speaking, 
securities. The first is the advent of zero coupon securities, and the 
other is the interest-rate swap. Basically, a zero coupon security pays 
no current interest, rather it is issued at a discount from face value 
similar to old fashioned savings bonds or treasury bills today and it is 
paid only on maturity. The difference between the principal amount 
of the security and the issued amount represents the interest. 
Unlike a treasury bill, however, zero coupons are generally of 
intermediate or long-term maturity. The advantage to the issuer is 
that there is no impact on cash flow during the period that the secur- 
ity is outstanding. With an ordinary investment such as a govern- 
ment bond, when interest coupons are paid on a semiannual basis, 
the investor has to reinvest that interest, and the rate at which that 
interest can be reinvested affects the yield-to-maturity .of the total 
investment. Although there is a fixed interest rate on the bond, the 
total return from the investment is a function of the rates that are 
current at the time those interest payments are made. 
Thus, there is considerable uncertainty as to the total yield from 
an ordinary long-term treasury bond or other long-term bond. A 
zero coupon, however, is sold at a discount which represents a fixed 
compound interest at the end of the term, so an investor knows pre- 
cisely what the yield-to-maturity will be. It is a very convenient tool 
for financing children's education and other future events. The full 
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rate of the investment is locked in at the outset. It is a very innova- 
tive way to cope with the problem of volatile interest rates. 
The second development falls into a category of what has come 
to be known as "interest rate swaps." This is a market that is grow- 
ing significantly and can be best described with an illustration. 
There are two borrowers. Let us call the first borrower "LT." LT is 
a company that has ready access to the long-term bond market. It 
can raise money on a long-term basis very cheaply and effectively. 
Assume that LT wants to use the proceeds from its borrowing for 
current transactions. LT would like to borrow in the short-term mar- 
kets and pay current interest rates but does not have satisfactory ac- 
cess to those markets. 
Let us call the second borrower "ST." ST has access to the 
short-term markets but has little access to the long-term markets. ST 
would like to finance a plant that will pay out only over a long period 
of time. In determining the economic viability of that plant, ST 
would like a fixed rate so it can compare the cost of capital to the 
returns that the plant will produce. 
In the theoretical case ST and LT come together, and ST, who 
has access to the short-term market, agrees with LT to pay him an 
amount equal to a fixed, long-term rate on a notional amount of 
$100 million for the next fifteen years. LT uses that stream of pay- 
ments to cover his obligations on a $100 million long-term borrow- 
ing that he makes in the long-term markets. In return, LT agrees to 
pay ST one percent above the prime rate or the LIBOR rate4 on 
$100 million for the next fifteen years. ST, who is actually paying the 
long-term rate, uses that stream of payments to cover the interest on 
his short-term borrowing of $100 million over the fifteen-year pe- 
riod. ST has accomplished his objective of paying the long-term 
fixed rate, and LT is paying the short-term rate, yet no principal has 
changed hands. 
Two problems may arise in this theoretical case. First, LT and 
ST may be unable to find each other. Second, if they found each 
other, each would worry about the credit of the other over this very 
long period of time. The result is that a bank acts as intermediary. 
LT deals with the bank as if the bank were the short-term borrower, 
ST deals with the bank as if it were the long-term borrower, and the 
bank runs a "matched book." 
Although that is the way it began, the market is changing dra- 
matically. Many banks no longer are running matched books. They 
are simply taking the interest rate risks on both sides and hedging 
their risks through interest rates futures and other devices. Other 
banks now are starting to offer arrangements called "floor/ceiling 
-- - 
4 LIBOR rate is the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate. It is the interest rate that 
London banks charge preferred customers on loans of United States dollars. 
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agreements." The bank will agree with a short-term borrower who is 
subject to fluctuations in interest rates that if the short-term rates 
rise above a certain percentage, the bank will pay the difference. If 
the rates fall below a certain percentage, the borrower will pay the 
difference. The borrower has a range in which it is prepared to take 
the risk, and the bank is compensated by fee income. Some banks 
now are issuing plain ceiling agreements in which the bank agrees 
with the short-term borrower that if the rate rises above a certain 
percentage, the bank will pay the difference. 
I have called the second major trend in financing increasing 
"dealerization" of the market. This is related to rule 415, which pro- 
vides for shelf registrations for qualified  issuer^.^ In the old days, 
securities firms had two quite different departments. The corporate 
finance department handled new issues and dealt with the attorneys 
who did the prospectuses and the due diligence. The syndicate de- 
partment would also deal with other investment banking firms and 
assemble a group of firms to underwrite securities. The other de- 
partment consisted of the brokers and traders. Except in the case of 
those over-the-counter securities where the firm made a market and 
acted as dealer and trader, the firm acted as agent and not as princi- 
pal. Twenty years ago, acting as dealer was by far the less important 
part of the firm's business. 
One of the most extraordinary financial events of the post- 
World War I1 period has been the institutionalization of savings in 
this country and its profound effect on the financial markets. In 1948 
there were approximately $3 billion in private pension plans. Today 
there are over $500 billion in private pension plans. Over seventy 
percent of the trading on the New York Stock Exchange is repre- 
sented by financial institutions and that excludes mutual funds which 
are treated as individuals. This significant change in the nature of 
the investing community has had a dramatic effect on securities 
firms. 
Institutions buy securities in very large quantities because it is 
expensive to monitor a large number of issues. Institutions have 
very large amounts of money to invest, they need liquidity, and they 
need companies that are widely followed. Because they buy in large 
quantities, they also sell in large quantities. The auction process on 
the floor of the stock exchanges, even the New York Stock Exchange 
which has a very effective auction process, is simply not capable of 
handling transactions of that size. During the 1970s many securities 
firms were forced to acquire larger and larger amounts of capital to 
position sales of blocks of securities. The positioning institutional 
broker agreed to buy the block at a fixed price and take the risk that 
the security could be distributed at that price or better. 
5 17 C.F.R. 8 230.415 (1984). 
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Those were clearly secondary market transactions, yet they have 
had an impact on what is happening today in the capital raising mar- 
ket. The need to position securities forced a small number of firms 
to acquire very large amounts of capital, and those firms developed 
very sophisticated distribution mechanisms that were quite different 
from the syndicate process for selling large blocks of securities. The 
distribution of blocks involved direct dealings between the upstairs 
dealers at the firms and institutions through a variety of electronic 
means. They were wholly outside the auction process. 
What does all this have to do with rule 415? Not long ago the 
Securities and Exchange Commission began to feel the effect of in- 
terest rate volatility. Companies began to complain that the volatility 
of interest rates resulted in very short "windows in the market," and 
that they could not wait fifteen days while the Commission processed 
their registration statements. In response, in the 1970s, the Com- 
mission progressively shortened the registration period applicable to 
very large issuers to approximately forty-eight hours. 
As the Commission was shortening the processing period, inter- 
est rates were becoming more volatile and corporate treasurers con- 
tinued complaining. In 1981 the Commission proposed to extend 
the availability of shelf registrations to primary offerings by larger 
issuers. I was a member of the Commission at that time, and I know 
that no one at the Commission recognized how significant this 
"small" change would be. Initially, there were virtually no com- 
ments. Finally, Morgan Stanley and a group of other firms looked at 
what the Commission was doing and recognized that it would have a 
profound effect. 
Under rule 415, the registration statement is declared effective 
before the terms of the offering are fixed. The issuer has very lim- 
ited discussions with a small number of underwriting firms that indi- 
cate an interest in participating. The treasurer or chief financial 
officer waits for one of these windows in the market to open. When 
the window is open, immediately the firms are called and invited to 
bid. The firms bid, the issuer picks a firm, and the offering is made 
that afternoon or  the next day. There is obviously inadequate time 
to conduct any type of due diligence effort at that point. In a techni- 
cal sense, the Commission has responded to that problem by inte- 
grating the 1933 Act and 1934 Act disclosure systems, but the 
underlying problem of the underwriter's obligation to learn enough 
about the company still exists. 
Not only is there insufficient time for due diligence, but there is 
inadequate time to form a large syndicate. Consequently, the major 
underwriters find themselves taking larger and larger positions that 
could lose substantial value if the credit markets turn against them 
before HelnO the positions line - -  10 are N.C.J. sold. I n t  Qnly L .  & a corn. hangful eg. of 204 f i r ~ g  1 have the capital 
necessary for these transactions, which has resulted in a large con- 
centration of investment banking business. The securities industry, 
and in particular, the underwriting capital raising process, are even 
more concentrated than the banking industry. 
Because there is inadequate time to form a syndicate, the distri- 
bution process tends to be undertaken through the trading desk 
rather than through the syndicate process. This results in an increas- 
ing institutionalization of the markets. If a securities firm is holding 
$100 million worth of a security in inventory, it wants to dispose of it 
very quickly. Retail distribution can be slow. Therefore, firms tend 
to solicit the people who can buy in the largest quantity, the large 
financial institutions. There is a fair amount of empirical evidence 
that a higher percentage of rule 415 offerings are sold to institutions 
than any other kind of ~ f fe r ings .~  If the trend continues, one can 
envision large financial institutions engaging in the kind of sub-un- 
derwriting role, with attendant Glass-Steagall7 implications, that in- 
surance companies and banks play in Great Britain, where they are 
an intermediate stage in the public distribution process. 
Although legally and practically only very large companies are 
involved, small issuers also should be interested in this trend. If rule 
415 is combined with the integrated disclosure system, the lines be- 
tween the public and private securities markets are progressively 
blurred. There are many small and medium sized companies that are 
in a continuous disclosure mode and have access to Form S-2, for 
e ~ a m p l e . ~  Registration has become a very easy process, and the 
question whether to sell securities in a registered offering or as a 
private placement is now much less important. If you distribute to a 
small number of people and you are unsure whether you qualify for 
the private placement exemption, it is easy to register. I think we will 
see increasing numbers of distributions into ongoing trading mar- 
kets by companies of all sizes and shapes as long as there is enough 
liquidity in the market to handle the distribution. There is certainly 
no legal reason why a company that can file a Form S-2 registration 
statement cannot finance through the ordinary trading market. 
There is no need for rule 415 as long as the distribution commences 
at the time of effectiveness of the registration statement. There is no 
See H .  BLOOMENTHAL, 1983 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 5 6.17(4) (1983). Bloomen- 
thal expresses the Commission's concern that rule 415 will be used to bypass traditional 
distribution techniques and place large blocks directly with institutional investors. See also 
SEC Securities Act Release No. 6391, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) n ss.108 (1982). 
7 Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. $ 5  347a-347b, 412 (1982). 
8 17 C.F.R. 5 239.12 (1984). Form S-2 provides an abbreviated registration process 
under the 1933 Act for qualified issuers which have been reporting companies for three 
years and have filed all reports timely during the past twelve months and the portion of the 
month in which the registration is filed. 
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need to have a fixed price underwriting in which the underwriter 
takes the risk of distribution. 
Briefly, I will discuss the internationalization of the securities 
market. Although it has a small impact on our lives today, in the long 
run, this trend toward a single, if not worldwide, international capital 
market will have the most profound impact on the financial regula- 
tory system and ultimately on financing techniques. 
In the primary markets, which includes the capital-raising pro- 
cess, it has become routine for the larger companies to decide 
whether to finance in the Eurodollar market or the United States 
market. The interest rate windows open up at different times in each 
market. 
More interesting is the growth of the integration of secondary 
trading. If a financial institution wants an instrument to achieve a 
certain financial objective for its portfolio, it carefully examines 
Eurodollar securities of all types, including Eurodollar certificates of 
deposit and Eurodollar bonds. Ten years ago the Commission is- 
sued an elaborate release dealing with the problem of flowback and 
the steps that should be taken to avoid securities sold in Europe from 
being traded in the United States markets without regi~tra t ion.~ The 
practices of market participants have advanced miles beyond the 
conditions of that release. The Commission either does not know 
what is happening or does not know how to deal with it. More signif- 
icantly though, when the market is broader than the regulatory sys- 
tem, regulations do not work. Why bother to subject yourself to 
United States disclosure rules when you can access the same inves- 
tors by selling in Europe? Why worry about United States insider 
trading rules when you can buy the same securities in Europe? 
"Synthetic securities" is one of the most interesting and quickly 
developing areas in the financial markets. The underlying idea is 
that an investment banker takes existing securities that have certain 
financial attributes and then recombines those attributes in different 
ways that investors will find more attractive. For example, zero cou- 
pon securities are attractive because they lock in yields. Some clever 
bankers found that it would be possible to combine zero coupon se- 
curities with the security and long-term maturity of the treasury 
credit. The only problem is that while the Treasury issues treasury 
bills at a discount, it does not issue bonds at a discount. That did not 
deter the people who ultimately created a zoological garden of syn- 
thetic securities called "cats," "tigers," and "cougars." 
Basically, these synthetic securities involve the purchase and re- 
sale of a very large treasury bond. The coupons are stripped from 
the bond. There is a stream of semiannual payments, which the cou- 
9 SEC Release No. 33-4908, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ll 1363 (July 9, 1964). 
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pons represent, and then a large payment at maturity. The right to 
each payment is sold on original issue discount basis. In other 
words, the right to receive each interest payment is sold for a price 
less than its face amount. The discount represents an agreed upon 
interest rate that is attractive to an investor looking for a locked-in 
yield. The treasury bond is divided into many little pieces. Through 
the magic of compound interest a small investment will triple by the 
maturity date. 
How is the bond split? Typically it is placed in a bank custody 
arrangement, and the bank sells receipts that represent the right to 
receive each payment. "Tigers," for example, stands for treasury 
growth receipts. "Cougars" and "cats" are similar arrangements. 
The receipts have a federal credit, and a locked-in rate, they trade in 
the secondary market, and some are listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
There is a host of legal questions related to synthetic securities, 
including those arising under the Investment Company Actlo and 
the Securities Act of 1933. The Commission has issued a series of 
no-action letters," indicating that if it is possible to give investors 
what the Commission calls direct rights in the underlying securities 
held in custody, then the arrangement is legitimate.12 Lawyers have 
thus created legal structures designed to give investors direct rights 
to the securities. For example, investors are given the right to sue on 
the security in the unlikely event that the federal government de- 
faults on its payments. This is the same approach that has been used 
in the development of a family of new mortgage-based securities. 
The traditional "Ginnie Mae" (GNMA) arrangement involves taking 
mortgages, putting them in a pool, and selling a pass-through inter- 
est to investors.13 Investors are entitled to a pro rata share of the 
return. Their interest and principal is a function of the aggregate 
interest and principal payments by all the underlying mortgagors. 
These new instruments are called CMOS, or Collateralized 
Mortgage Obligations. They are not pass-through vehicles. The 
mortgages are put in a pool, and then the bonds are issued as debt 
obligations of the entity that maintains the pool. The bond can be 
issued at an original issue discount or otherwise. Different series of 
bonds represent the right to receive different payments anticipated 
by the mortgagors. Short-term investors, for example, are given the 
lo 15 U.S.C. $5  80a-1 to -64 (1982). 
l 1  Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Son Co. (December 16, 1974) (SEC No-Action Letter, on 
WESTLAW, Fsec Library, Nal File); First & Merchants Corp. (September 5, 1975) (SEC No- 
Action Letter, on WESTLAW, Fsec Library, Nal File). 
I2 Direct rights in securities include, for example, the right to return on investment 
and the right to sue on the security in case of default. 
1s GNMA is the commonly accepted abbreviation for Guaranteed National Mortgage 
Association. 
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first three years of payments, which are priced to produce a yield that 
is appropriate for a three-year maturity. Later payments would go to 
pay the longer maturity bonds. It is also possible to use this tech- 
nique to convert old, low-yield mortgages into short-term instru- 
ments through the addition of "put" rights. 
One last trend that is particularly interesting is that of pooling 
and selling interests in financial instruments. Recently, banks have 
increasingly sought to syndicate, or  sell participations in, loans as a 
way of sharing the credit risk and the need for capital. Banks have 
now started selling participations in loans to nonbank institutional 
investors. This practice raises questions as to whether the pool is an 
investment company and whether the participation interest is a se- 
curity. Nonbank institutions, especially retailers and companies with 
finance company subsidiaries that have large amounts of financial as- 
sets, such as receivables, are considering pooling these assets and 
selling the interests. The utility of this idea is growing at a great rate, 
and like all the recent changes in the world of financing, it is worth 
understanding. 
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